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size of fiscal adjustment, the impact of deficit reductions, and
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ing cuts and tax reform), and new directions for research (the
growth effects and the political economy of fiscal policy).
The Policy, Research, and External  Affairs Complex  distributes PRE Working Papers to disseminate the findings of work in progress and
to encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others intcrested in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
















































































































dPok,Reser.och,  and External  Affairs
Trade  Policy
WPS 724
This paper-  a product of the Trade Policy Division, Country Economics Department-  is part of a larger
effort in PRE to study the sustainability of adjustment (RPO 675-32). This paper appeared in a symposium,
Fiscal Issues in Adjustment in Developing Countries, published by Richerche Economiche, vol. 14, 1990.
Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
Please contact Dawn Ballantyne, room N 10-019, extension 37947 (26 pages).
Adjustment to the macroeconomic crises of the  On the macrocconcl. .cs  of adjustment, they
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1990.1.  Introduction
Rising  international  interest  rates,  falling  terms  of trade,  and  the
foreclosing  of commercial  credit,  forced  the  majority  of developing  countries
to pursue  drastic  adjustment  policies. In spite  of differences  in initial
conditions  and in ideological  predilections,  common  adjustment  patterns  were
observed  across  many  countries.  Initially  the focus  was  on short-run
stabilization,in  particular  on restoring  a  viable  balance  of payments  and  on
servicing  the external  debt.  Soon it  became  apparent  that short-run  measures
alone  would  be insufficient  to restore  sustainable  long-run  growth. Short-run
measures  were thus  complemented  by structural  reforms  aimed  at increasing  the
efficLency  of resource  use.  Yet,  for  many observers,the  success  of adjustment
has  been lLmited  to containing  the  debt  crisis.  Growth  has  only resumed  ln  a
handful  of countrLes. Severe  macroecononic  imbalances  subaLst  Ln the
remainder.
It L  now  widely  recognized  that adjustment  was least  successful  on the
fLcal  front. Deallng  with fLscal  deficits  remaLns  today  one  of the  most
vexing  problem  for  the  majority  of developing  countries. For  many,  growing
fLcai  defLcits  led  to money  creation  as  the  maln source  of flnancing  followed
by spirallLng  LnflatLon,  an erosion  of the  tax  base,  and  even  larger  fLical
imbalances. Even countries  that contained  thelr  fLcal  deficits  usually  dld
so at great  costs  maLnly  by LndLscriminate  expenditure  cutting. The inability
to raise  taxes  made apparent  many inherent  flaws  in  their  tax  systems. Thus,
to successfully  cope  wLth  the fiscal  crLsis,  short-run  fiscal  measures  had  to
be accompanied  by  major  overhauls  of the  tax syct=m.
The  origins  of the fLical  crLisi  are  well-known. For  countries  that  had
access  to borrowlng  on private  capital  markets,  the recyc'  ng of petrodollars
at low  borrowing  costs  opened  the  door  to ambitLous  Lnvestment  programmes.
The  average  private  Lnvestment  rate for  a  sample  of middle-Lncome  countrles
(publlc  Lnvestment  rates  Ln  parenthesLs)  rose from  19.0 (6.2)  percent  of GDP
durLng  1970-74  to 22.6 (7.9)  percent  during  1975-82. A aLmilar  pattern  was
observed  for  low-lncome  countries  which  also  experienced  a rLse  Ln publLc  andprivate investment rates (see Faini and de Melo (1990,table 4).  For borrowers
in capital markets, the crisis occurred when they could no longer borrow while
being concurrently faced with higher interest rates on their external debt.
For low-income countries, the fiscal crisis was exacerbated by deteriorating
terms of trade.
The papers in this symposium deal with issues raised by the fiscal
crisis.  In section 2, we discuss the relationship between the external debt
and the fiscal crisis and take a look at recent trends in fiscal deficits,
government expenditures and fiscal revenues.  The next two sections review
briefly the main themes covered by the papers in this symposium:  section 3
covers the macroeconomics of fiscal deficits and section 4 issues in reforming
fiscal systems.  Finally section 5 suggests news areas for research.
2.  Fiscal trends: a look at the evidence
The immediate origins of the fiscal crisis was the assumption by
governments --  under strong external pressure --  of privately contracted debt.
Governments also faced internal pressures caused by the effects of short-run
adjustment policies involving sharp devaluations required to raise foreign
exchange to service the external debt.  The ensuing sharp depreciations of the
real exchange rate helped generate the needed foreign exchange, but resulted
in capital losses for foreign-denominated debt holders.  Thus,in addition to
guaranteeing the privately contracted external debt, governments faced
increasing budgetary pressures as they often had to grant preferential
exchange rates to holders of foreign debt to cushion capital losses.
As a result, the external debt problem became first and foremost a
fiscal problem.  Real exchange rate depreciation and aggregate demand
contraction would succeed in improving the current account and would help the
economy service its external debt.  But, typically, foreign exchange earnings
were in private hands, while foreign exchange obligations were publicly held.
A  way had to be found to transfer foreign exchange earnings from the private
2sector to the government.  This dual need to transfer resources abroad and,
internally, from the private to the public sector, has become known as the
"twin transfer problem".
How important has been this fiocal crisis and how have countries reacted
to the crisis?  To answer properly this question requires comparable data on
the consolidated public rector (inclusive  of the Central Bank, local
governments and public enterprises).  As mentioned earlier, many fiscal
operations li%.e  foreign exchange subsidies were undertaken by the Central
Bank.  These operations often amounted to a eizable percentage of GDP.
Unfortunately, they do not figure in the widely available data sets like the
International Monetary Fund's Government Financial Statistics (GFS)  which only
report Central Government operations.  Still, these statistics are useful to
indicate broad trends for the universe of developing countries and are used in
the tables that follow.
Tables 1 and 2 give averages for middle and low-income countries between
1975 and 1988.  The breakdown into period averages is to smooth out year-to-
year fluctuations, and to try to capture the effects of significant changes in
the external environment.  The breakdown into two country groupings reflects
the widely held view that low-income countries have less resilience in their
fiscal systems and a different tax revenue structure because of a larger share
of agriculture  in GDP (a  sector difficult to tax) and because of
less-developed administrative capabilities.1
The two tables suggest several stylized developments. Start with fiscal
deficit and expenditure trends in Table 1.2  First,the overall deficit showed
a  worsening trend during the period of easy money (1979-81) and during the
aftermath of the debt crisis (1982-85) for both low-income and middle-income
countries.  This worsening trend was only arrested for middle-income countries
in the last period (1986-88) when the overall deficit was, on average, reduced
by two percentage points of GDP.  During the first sub-period this trend
reflected expansionary fiscal policies, as indicated by the evolution of total
expenditures in column 3.  Starting in 1982, with the onset of the debt
3Table  1
Fiscal  Deficits  and  Expenditure  Trend3:  Period  Averaaes  for Low-Income  ILY) and Middle-Income  (MY) Countries
Overall  Primary  Total  Interest  Capital
Deficit/GDP  De!ficit/GDP  Expenditure(TE)/GDP  Payments/TE  Expenditures/TE
Period  Averages  LY  MY  LY  MY  LY  mY  LY  MY  LY  MY
1975  to  1978  -3.2  -1.7  -'!.2  0.0  19.1  19.5  5.4  6.3  22.8  25.7
1979  to  1981  -3.8  -2.1  -;.9  0.0  20.0  21.3  7.2  8.8  22.3  22.4
1982  to 1985  -4.3  -4.0  -:.5  -1.1  20.5  23.0  11.7  14.9  20.  17.4
1986  to  1988  -4.3  -2.1  -:..5  1.4  21.0  21.7  13.5  17.8  24.7  15.3
Notes:  Low-income  (LY)  countries  (:16)  are  countries  with  a 1980  income  per  capita  below  $500.  Middle  income
(MY) countries  (45)  include  countries  with  an income  per capita  above  $500  and below  $4000.
Data  Sources:  Government  Financial  :;tatistics of  the  IMF deficit  refers  to the  deficit  of the  central
government.Table 2
Fiscal Revenue Trends:  Period Averaaes for Low Income ILYJ and Middle-Income tMY) Countries
Total  Domestic  International
Revenue(TR)/GDP  Income Tax/(TR)  Tax/(TR)  Tax/(TR)  Grants/(TR)
Period Averages  LY  MY  LX  MY  LY  mY  LY  MY  LY  MY
1975 to 1978  16.1  17.5  23.2  25.0  24.1  30.9  32.3  23.8  8.0  4.3
1979 to 1981  15.8  19.3  22.4  28.3  27.9  35.1  35.1  21.6  10.2  4.0
1982 to 1985  17.0  20.4  23.2  28.3  19.1  40.9  29.2  19.8  8.3  3.1
1986 TO 1988  16.3  20.8  22.4  26.7  27.3  37.7  30.9  17.6  9.9  3.4
Notes;  Same definitions and same sample as in Table 1.
Data Sourcess  Same as Table 1.crisis, higher interest payments (column 4 in Table 1) account significantly
for increaeing budget imbalances.  The primary deficit, which excludes
interest payments and is largely outside the control of fiscal authoritiee,
may therefore provide a better indicator of the governments' efforts to reduce
fiscal imbalances.  The trend revealed by the period averages in Table  1
suggests that it is only since 1986 that an improvement is noticeable in tho
primary deficit, especially among middle-income countries which managed a
swing of 2.':  percentage points of GDP to produce a  primary surplus.  Not
surprisingly, the brunt of adjustment among middle-income countrles fell on
capital rather than on current expenditures.  Somewhat surprisingly,the data
indicate an increase in capital expenditures for the low-income group since
1986.  However, overall, the figures in Table 1 indicate a great insensitivity
of total government expenditures to the fiscal crisis.
Turning to fiscal revenues,they too, have been insensitive to the fiscal
crisis (Table 2).  Since the onset of the crisis, neither group has been able
to raise significantly fiscal revenues.  Moreover, both groups have registered
a declining share of income taxes in total revenues.  Direct taxes being
typically the most progressive and buoyant component of the tax system, this
trend may signal both, efficiency loss, and equity deterioration.  For
low-income countries, trade tax revenues continue to be the most important
source of tax revenue.  With import growth effectively constrained by foreign
exchange earnings, the reliance on trade taxes further reduces the buoyancy of
the tax system for this group of countries.  At the same time,the role of
foreign grants in helping alleviate the crisis has been relatively small, even
for low income countries.
Stagnant fiscal revenues coupled with difficulties in compressing
expenditures, implies limited progress towards reducing fiscal imbalances. 3
With foreign borrowing foreclosed, this meant that governments had to rely on
domestic sources of financing.  For countries with relatively underdeveloped
capital markets, borrowing from the Central Bank was the only ramaining
option.  The ensuing increase in liquidity could only result either in
6run-away inflation,  or in capital flight, or in a combination of both.
Countries with more developed financLal markets, could rely on
non-inflationary sources of finance at the  cost  of higher interest rates, and
possibly unstable debt dynamics.
3.  The macroeconomics of fiscal adjustment
The debt and fiscal crises combined to force many developing countries
to undertake adjustement programs, often with the support of international
organizationo like the IMF and the World Bank.  The  immediate aim of these
programs was to stabilize the  economy by eliminating the  main  sources of
macroeconomic imbalances.  To help restore growth, these  programs included
structural reforms in the areas of trade, financial, agricultural and public
sector management policies.  These reforms, designed to improve resource
allocation and broaden the scope of market mechanisms, were heavily criticized
for their alleged ideological bias and poor design. 4 Fiscal policy came to
be an essential component of adjustment programs.  On the one hand the
recovery of fiscal discipline was viewed as a prerequisite for macroeconomic
stabilization.  On the other, the reform of existing fiscal incentives war
deemed a fundamental step in eliminating the major growth-retarding
a) The size of fiscal adjustment
While the need s?or  fiscal restraint was not generally disputed, the size
of the required fiscal adjustment was much more controversial.  As noted by
Vito Tanzi in "Fiscal Issues in Adjustment Programs", programs may have
possibly aimed at the elimination of fiscal deficits.  However, quite
fortunately, this balanced budget rule has not proved to be popular in the
design of actual adjustment programs. A more flexible approach is to try to
evaluate the size of the budget deficit which can be financed without causing
7major macroeconomic imbalances. Thio is, at large, the approach taken by the
International Monetary Fund. There are of course severe problemo in assessing
the long-run viability of fiscal policy. First, as mentioned e. lier, is the
statistical difficulty of assembling comprehensive information about the
public sector's operations, including the Central Bank, local governments,
etc. Second, there are still unresolved theoretical issues. In her paper,
building on the work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Buiter (1985, 1988),
Martha do Halo presents in her paper "Fiecal Adjustment in High-Debt
Countries" an interesting attempt to compute the size of the required fiscal
adjustment.  Her starting point is the government budget identity which states
that the sum of the primary deficit and interest expenses must be financed
from a combination of foreign borrowing, domestic borrowing and money
creation. To take the simple case of a financially closed economy (i.e. an
economy with no foreign debt), simple manipulations of this identity lead to
the well-known equation for debt dynamics:
(1)  [b =  (r  - n) b +  d - m
where b, d and m denote respectively the stock of public debt, the primary
deficit and the size of monetary financing. All variables are normalised by
GDP and a dot represents a time derivative. In this identity r and n indicate
the real interest rate and the growth rate of the economy, respectively.
This equation, which can be generalised in several ways to allow for
foreign debt and public investment, is useful for sustainability analysis.
Suppose the government aims at stabilising the debt to GDP ratio (i.e. tO
achieve b =  0), but at the same time wants to avoid excessive reliance on
inflationary financing. For qiven values of r and n, one can use equation 1 to
compute the resulting primary aeficit, d. one interesting implication of this
approach is that, by postponing adjustment and letting the debt to GDP ratio
grow further, the sustainable primary deficit will be smaller and the required
adjustment larger. Data limitations force de Melo to apply this approach only
8to a handful of  countries. Her results suggest that high-debt countries have
progressed toward sustainability, but at the cost of large scale financial
repression. As a  matter of fact, a typical feature of her sample of countrieo
is that they  pay  a very low interest rate on domestic debt. This may not be a
sustainable feature. Interestingly enough, her calculations indicate that even
low-debt countries appear to have a  fiscal problem. The  required deficit
reduction for thie group is estimated to be 2.5 percent of GDP.
While this sustainability approach provides several useful insighte, its
shortcomings should not be underestimated. For instance, a crucial assumption
is that both the growth rate and the real interest rate are exogenously given.
If we allow for the likely impact of fiscal policy on both r and n, the
conditions for sustainability are likely to be much more stringent (Galli,
1985). Indeed, for a given monetary policy, an expansionary fiscal policy will
lead to higher real interest rates and, as a result, to lower investment and
lower growth. Finally note that, in computing the cost of domestic debt, one
typically has to rely on average values. With widespread financial repression.
this may represent a fairly inaccurate measure of the marginal interest rate
on domestic debt. Then the sustainable deficit calculations will underestimate
the required adjustment.
b) The impact of deficit reductions
Economic theory alone does not provide an unambiguous answer on the
macroeconomic effects of deficit reductions. Depending on the assumed
macroeconomic closure, the mode of deficit financing and the initial
condLtions in the economy, the  theoretical outcome of greater fiscal restraint
will be different.  However, under a set of well defined assumptions, this
ambiguity disappears.  In his paper "Orthodox Vodels for Adjustment and
Growth",  Peter Montiel provides a neat description of the so-called orthodox
model of adjustment.  His model may not provide an accurate description of
actual adjustment programs supported by the IMF or the World Bank, but it
9gives useful insights on the theoretical underpinnings of those institutions'
recommendations.
Consider the case of a small open economy, where output is supply
determined and full employment conditions prevail. Output growth is a function
of the availability of capital only. However, because of the existence of a
repressed financial system, capital accumulation, i.e. investment, is
determined residually by credit markets conditions. More specifically,
investment is equal to private saving minus e-he  desired accumulation of
financial assets by private agents  plus  the change in the stock of banks'
credit to the private sector. Consider then the effect of a  decline in the
rate of change of the public sector's credit (brought about by a fall in
government spending). Suppose also that this decline is matched by a (smaller)
increase in credit to the private sector. By assumption, income and interest
rates are unaffected. Therefore, also saving and assets accumulation do not
change. Investment, as a result, increases with a beneficial impact on growth.
Also, given that the increase in investment is smaller than the (absolute)
value of the decline in government spending, total absorption falls and the
current account improves. The orthodox model therefore predicts an unambiguous
positive impact of fiscal restraint on both growth and the external account.
The two assumptions that output is supply determined and that there is
no Lndependent investment function play a critical role in the orthodox model,
as pointed out by Montiel himself.  In "Fiscal Issues in Macroeconomic
Stabilzation:  A Structuralist Perspective" by Lance Taylor, he analyses the
impllcations of relaxing these assumptions.  First, and foremost, the decline
in aggregate demand attendant on a more restrictive fiscal policy stance may
have a contractlonary impact on output.  The evidence Taylor relies upon comes
from a  study of stabilization episodes in 18 countries, organlsed by the World
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER). Those studies show that
fiscal restraints were generally followed by a fall in output levels. Second,
the contractLonay impact of restrictive fiecal policies may be amplifled by
the ensuing fall ln investment. Total investment may fall, rather than
10increase ae predicted by the orthodox model, for two reaoons: a) the
contraction in aggregate demand may, through a  standard accelerator effect,
depress investment; b) typically, public  investment takes the brunt of fiscal
cuts and may be complementary to private investment. As to the alleged
poeitive effects of fiscal deficits reductions on the current account, Taylor
argues that such improvements must be predicated mostly on the fall of imports
coming from output contraction. Unless export goods are also consumed
domestically (rice in Thailand) or manufactures represent a substantial share
of total exports, export growth will not be the major factor behind the
improvement in the current account.
The conflicting predictions of  the structuralist and orthodox models
with respect to the behaviour in investment are further investigated by  Ajay
Chhibber and Mansoor Dailami in their paper "Fiscal Policy and Private
Investment in Developing Countries:  Recent Evidence on Key Selected Issues".
In their review of existing empirical evidence, they conclude that
expansionary fiscal policies will typically crowd out investment through
credit rationing and interest rate effects. The relative importance of the two
channels will depend on the degree of financial liberalization in the economy.
In a financially repressed economy, even a money-financed fiscal expansion
will be associated with lower investment, insofar as the consequent rise in
inflation will reduce real interest rates and depress saving.  on  the
structuralist side, Chhibber and Dailami find that, to a large extent, an
increase in public investment has a positive effect on  private investment.
c) Fiscal etfects of devaluation
The typical structuralist critique of orthodox policy packages is that
they impose unnecessary hardships. One such exampl  is the potential
unintended contractionary effect of a devaluation.  In a classical
contribution, Krugman and Taylor (1977)  argued that devaluation may be
contractionary insofar as it redistributes income from low to high savers and
depresses demand.  Later contributions (see citations in Chhibber and Dailami)
11have shown that, to the extent that it leado to higher real prices of imported
inputs, to higher product wages under widespread indexation or to a lower
volume of credit, devaluation may be contractionary also from the supply oide.
Overlooking the potential contractionary impact of a devaluation in an
edjustment program which relies on  devaluation, may therefore lead to a  severe
output loss, i.e. to an "overkill"  which is often mentioned in the
structuralist literature.
Devaluation is also likely to have fiscal effects. First is the capital
loss resulting from a real exchange rate depreciation that was mentioned
earlier.  Given  the  large magnitude of estimated real exchange  rate
depreciation occasioned by the debt crisis (Faini  and de Melo, 1990, Table 1
estinmaLa  an average real exchange rate depreciation of between 30 and 40
percent during 1982-86 compared with 1978-81 levels), this capital loss is
likely to be substantial. Second, large debtors may also be large in their
principal export markets (Brazil in coffee). For those large debtors, relying
on devaluation to generate foreign exchange to service their debt is likely to
lead to a terms of trade lose. Presumably small countries in their principal
export markets should not be worried about using devalua,ion because they face
exogenous terms of trade.  Not so.  In his paper "The Transfer Problem in
Small Open Economies:  Exchange Rate and Fiscal Policies for Debt Service",
Dani Rodrik shows that, as is often the case, conventional presumptions can
happen to be quite misleading. Consider the case of a small debtor country.
Most of its foreign debt is in the hands of the public sector. As mentioned
earlier, this is a realistic feature of most highly indebted developing
countries. The economy faces a double transfer problem. rusou:.cS mu6t  bu
transfered abroad to service the foreign debt, but first the public sector
must obtain the required foreign exchange from the private sector. A real
depreciation, i.e. a fall in  the relative price of non-traded goods, will
facilitate the external transfer (by compressing the  excess demand for traded
goods), but may exacerbate the problems arising from  the required internal
transfer. Consider the case where non-traded goods are a net source of revenue
12for the government.  A real depreciation will then worsen the government's
terme of trade with respect to the private sector.  If the government relieB
at the margin on a distortionary tax (like the inflation tax) to meet its
revenue needs, it will need additional revenue with detrimental effects on the
economy.  Debt service therefore entails a "secondary burden", beyond the
resource loss caused by transfering resources abroad, because of deteriorating
internal terms of trade. Rodrik shows that, tariffs and, perhaps surprisingly,
even export subsidies can be welfare improving to the extent that they allow
debt service without generating a terms of trade loss for the government.
d) Expenditure cuts or tax increases?
IMF conditionality usually focusses on overall deficit reduction and
refrains from indicating how this objective should be achieved. According to
Joseph Gold of the IMF, "the Fund should not become involved in the detailed
decisions by which general policies are put into operation." 5 In this
approach, the choice of which taxes to raise and which expenditures to cut
does  not belong to the mandate of the  IMF and is therefore left to domestic
policy-makers.  Yet, as Tanzi convincingly argues, the choice between
increasing revenues and reducing expenditures represents "a central question
in adjustment programs", with significant macroeconomic and microeconomic
implications.
Consider first the issue from a macroeconomic point of view.  Standard
multiplier analysis suggests that the contractionary impact of expenditure
cute would be larger than the one resulting from a tax increase.
Utility-based  models  have stronger  theorAtieal  fniindAtinrp,  hut  fail  to
provide unambiguous answers.  Crucial and unresolved issues in this respect
include the planning horizon of economic agents and the private utility
implications of government spending.  A useful benchmark is provided by the
simple case where public expenditure does not affect the marginal utility of
private  consumption.  Consider the case where agents are infinitely lived,
presumably in a dynastic sense.  Then, under somewhat further stringent
13conditions, Ricardo-Barro equivalence applies:  a tax increase today, matched
by lower domestic borrowing, will lead agents to expect lower future taxation
and will be fully matched by a decline in saving.  Therefore, total aggregate
demand will be unaffected.  Similarly a decline in government spending will
not affect, by assumption, private marginal utility, but will induce private
agents to expect lower future taxation.  The consequent increase in private
consumption will again fully offset the decline in government spending.
Suppose however, as in Blanchard (1985) that, because of a finite probability
of dynastic extinction, private agents discount the future at a higher rate
than the government.  Then, expenditure cuts and revenue increases may have
different macroeconomic implications.  More specifically, because of the
existence of a finite probability of death, increases in tax revenues today
will not be fully discounted into lower future taxes and will therefore lead
rational private agents to reduce consumption.  Similarly reductions in
government spending will not be fully offset by increases in private spending.
Which of the two strategies is more contractionay will depend in a complex way
on the time pattern of future government surpluses.  The earlier taxation is
expected to decline in response to the drop in public spending, the more
lLmited will be the recessionary impact.
The previous discussion abstracts from several complicating factors.
For instance, it does not allow for the effect of liquidity constraints on
households which would prevent the intertemporal smoothing of consumption in
response to variations in disposable income. The models also postulate the
existence of lump-sum taxation. Financing choices become therefore irrelevant.
This result would no longer hold if the government had to rely on
distortionary taxation  (Rodriguez, 1989).  The problem becomes more complex
yet, if government expenditures affect private marginal utility.  Then a
reduction in public spending will lead to more (less)  private spending,
provided the two bear a substitute (complementary)  relationship.
Empiricai av5.dence  on the importance of Ricardian equivalence in
developing countries is scant.  Haque (1988) finds little empirical support to
14the claim that agents and governments discount the future at different rates.
Rossi (1988) is unable to identify a clear pattern of substitution between
private and public spending from a large cross-country analysis of developing
countries.  In the same paper, however, Rossi provides convincing evidence
about the pervasive presence of liquidity constraints in LDC's.  That finding,
by itaelf, casts doubt on the empirical relevance of Ricardian equivalence for
developing countries and is consistent with the results in Haque and Montiel
(1988) who find little or no support for Barro's proposition in an empirical
analysis of consumption behaviour in 15 developing countries.
So far no mention has been made of the distributional effects of deficit
reductions.  In their paper "The Fiscal System, Adjustment and the Poor",
Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Frances Stewart show how various etrategies to
achieve a given deficit reduction have different distributional implications.
More specifically, they show that, typically, the poor are little affected by
taxation, but may somewhat benefit from government spending.  Provided that
the alleviation of poverty represents a primary objective of public policy,
then reduction in fiscal imbalances should focus mostly on increased taxation.
Unfortunately, according to Cornia and Stewart, actual adjustment programs
undertaken with the support of the IMF appear to privilege expenditure cuts --
a  fact also acknowledged by Tanzi.  This pattern may not necessarily be
attributable to a full neglect of the objective of poverty alleviation, but
simply to the political and administrative difficulties of raising government
revenues.
4.  Reforming the fiscal system
Stagnant economic growth and the limited progress towards fiscal
stabilization, in particular the inability to raise significantly government
revenues, brought to the forefront the need to introduce radical reforms in
developing countries' fiscal systems, with the dual objectives of improving
resource allocation and avoiding indiscriminate expenditure cuts.  Widespread
75roforms  could  no longer  escape  the issue  of  which  expenditures  to cut  and
which  taxes  to raise. Also,  the fiscal  component  of adjustment  programs
should  be evaluated  not  only  on the  basis  of the deficit  reduction  they  had
achieved,  but also  on the  quality  of the fiscal  adjustment. Previously,  Tanzi
(1989)  went so far  as  to argue  that  the  Fund  should  be ready  to relax  its
fiscal  conditionality  and  require  less fiscal  adjustment,  provided  that
efficient,  growth-enhancing  measures  were being  concurrently  introduced. In
this  way  the  danger  of future  policy  reversal,  most likely  with temporary
palliatives  and  growth-retarding  measures,  would  be minimised,  and  the
durability  of adjustment  ensured. Focus  on the  quality  of adjustment  would
have  both  efficiency  and  equity  implications,  as  pointed  out  by Cornia  and
Stewart. We review  the evidence  on the  choice  of expenditure  cuts  and in  the
design  of tax reforms.
a) The choice  of expenditure  cuts
As pointed  out  in the introduction,  public  investment  took the  brunt  of
expenditure  cuts.  How  to evaluate  a reduction  in capital  expenditures  is  a
difficult,  and  yet, largely  unresolved  issue. On the one  hand,  inefficient
public  entreprise  investments  can,  and should  be,  cut.  On the  other  hand,
public  sector  investments  that  generate  externalities  and  that  are largely
complementary  with  private  sector  investmentc  should  bo Maintained. So Dhould
investments  with high social  returns. Not  surprisingly,  the  valuation  of
public  investments  is  touched  upon  in three  papers  in this symposium. 6 A
promising  strategy  to determine  where  to cut  public  expenditure  would  be to
try to identify,  possibly  with  the support  of the  World  Bank,  a set  of public
investment  projects  with the  highest  social  rates  of return. This  raises,
however,  several  thorny  issues. In  his  paper  "Prices,  Taxes  and  Planning",
Nicholas  Stern  analyses  the  interaction  between  tax  policies  and  project
ovaluation. He shows  how  cost-benefit  analysis  can  be a  useful  guide  to
public  investment  selection  and  highlights  the  pitfalls  of relying  on  market
prices  alone  as a guide  to action  in  the  presence  of widespread  distortions.
16Most contributions in this symposium agree that current expenditures
should also share some of the cuts.  They often dioagree, however, on tho
distribution of these cuts across expenditure categories.  Tanzi, for
instance, argues that cuts in public employment should be preferred to
reductions in public wages.  His argument is that the latter are not
sustainable and will be soon reversed when the economic emergency subsides.
Also wage cuts may lead to loss of motivation and lower productivity.  Cornia
and Stewart, on the other hand tackle the issue from an equity point of view.
They argue that cuts  in public wages will not have a regressive distributional
impact to the extent that public employees belong to the upper middle-income
scale.  Instead reductions in public employment are likely to reduce the
provision of public services with a negative impact on the poor.  However they
concur that reductions in public wages may have negative efficiency
implications.  A  further area of disagreement involves the extent to which
consumers'  subsidies should bear the consequences of fiscal restraints.  As
pointed out by Tanzi, subsidies often benefit the middle class with little
effect on the poor. Finally, all agree that military expenditures should not
be spared.
Cornia and Stewart also raise a forceful argument with regard to the
distribution of expenditure cuts.  On the basis of a large body of empirical
evidence, they argue that poverty alleviation and fiscal expenditure
discipline are not incompatible, provided that goverments are willing to
undertake a radical modification in the distribution of expenditures.  The
issue arises at two levels.  First, regarding the intersectoral allocation of
public expenditure, they show that regressive expenditures have acquired a
greater share of total spending for Latin America and Africa.  Second, is the
issue of the intrasectoral allocation of public spending.  Cornia and Stewart
provide vivid illustrations of the choices between child feeding vs. urban
subsidies, primary vs. higher education, preventive vs. hospital care.  Lower
volume of overall spending are compatible, in their approach, with a  better
targetting of government spending which could contribute substantially to th.e
17objective of poverty alleviation.  As far as actual trends are concerned, they
find  that  little progressive intrasectoral reallocation has occurred in health
care, but that more promising indications appear from trends in education.
b) Reforming the taxation system
Equity and efficiency issues arise also in the design of taxation reform.
In his paper  "Recent  Experience  with Tax Reform in Developing CountrLes",
Wayne Thirok provides considerable evidence both on the existence of
widespread distortions and on the pattern of recent tax reforms in developlng
countries.  Usually the stimulus for tax reforms came from large and
unsustalnable  fLscal deficits.  Thirsk shows how the tax system in many
developlng countries was heavily influenced by their colonial legacy, as it
was modelled along the lLnes of those found in developed countries.  This
influence was reflected in a very complex tax structure with emphasis on
progressive income taxes.  Other major features of typical tax systems
includeds  a cascaded structure  of indirect taxes (with no credit glven for
taxes on inputs); a schedular system for direct taxes (with different taxes
depending on the type of income); and, a proliferation of exceptions and
exemptions.  The resulting systems were much too complex for the
administrative capabilities of developing countries.  They encouraged too many
arbitrages which eroded the tax base. Small businesses could exploit the
differential in tax treatment between dividend and wage income;
intra-household transfers of income  would take advantage of the progressivity
of income taxes; firms would gear their financing strategy to the biases of
the corporate tax system.  A lack of constituency in favour of tax reforms and
the existence of powerful vested lnterests in support of the status quo
perpetuated the existing system until large fiecal deficits provided the
required stimulus for tax reforms.
Drawing on the recent experience of a number of developing countries,
Thirsk shows how tax reforms were typically designed to minimize the incentive
for tax-avoiding resource shifts.  They did so by applying the company tax to
18all forms of business organization, by aligning personal and corporate tax
rates, by broadening the personal and the corporate tax basis, and by
mitigating the tax bias in favour of debt finance.  Other major features of
the reformed systems included the lowering of direct tax rates, the
introduction of a value added tax and extensive inflation adjustment measures.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, lack of indexation had indeed proved  to  be
destabilising as inflation worsened the budget deficit which, in turn, fuelled
inflation.  Lack of indexation in the tax system also contributed to enhance
its distortionay effects.  Chhibber and Dailami document the size of the tax
bias in favour of debt finance in most developing countries and show how, in
the case of Korea, it was significantly affected by the level of inflation.
Substantial agreement on the thrust of reforms is apparent throughout
the papers in this symposium.  The need for lower tax rates and for a  check on
the proliferation of tax incentives is also forcefully argued by Tanzi.  There
are, however, also areas  of  disagreement in the design of tax reforms.  For
example, Tanzi argues in favour of the introduction of user charges for higher
education and health so as to discourage overuse and inefficient capacity
addition.  On the other hand, Cornia and Stewart claim that user fees are
invariably regressive, insofar as they discourage mainly the poor. Rich people
instead are less affected to the extent that the price elasticity of demand
declines with income.
A perhaps more fundamental issue is the basic inspiration behind tax
reforms.  All seem to privilege the need for tax simplifications and, to some
extent, the efficiency motive.  Are the two compatible? Optimal taxation
thecry  ^-.ncludes  n favour of non-uniorm  t_. r-toz.. But, _- Th'--!
convincingly argues, it assumes impossible informational requirements and
perfect tax administration.  Also the equity motive may clash with the desire
for simplicity. An equitable system may indeed require sophisticated
distinctions.  Again the issue is difficult to settle, insofar as complex tax
systems tend to offer a wide set of opportunities for tax evasion that benefit
rich people.  Yet, a larger weight to the equity motive in the design of tax
19reforms  oeems warranted.  For instance, as shown by Cornia and Stewart, moot
adjustment programs increased indirect taxes, which are often regressive.
S.  Now Directions
Disagreements about the likely macroeconomic impact of deficit
reductions, about the equity and efficiency effects of changes in the
composition of government expenditures point to the need for more evidence.
The pervasive tax reforms and drastic changes in government expenditures
should provide valuable information for a new generation of studies.  But
there are also new promising areas for research.  Below are two topics that
would increase our knowledge in the design of fi.e'cal  adjustment programs.
a) The growth effects of fiscal policy
In several instances, contributors to this symposium pointed out
linkages between public and private spending.  Both private consumption and
private investment will indeed depend on the level and the composition of
public expenditures.  The link may be direct, whenever public investment and
public current spending are either substitute or complementary to private
spending, or indirect, through interest rates and prices channels.  The level
and the structure of taxation was also found to exert a powerful influence on
the private sector's economic choices.  Since governments raise revenues
through taxation to finance both current and capital expenditures, the issue
of the size of government is an important one.  In some broad sense, there is
an "optimal" government size.
Such a question needs to be approached both at a  theoretical and an
empirical level.  One promising avenue would seem to be to draw on the new
growth theories that rely extensively on the notion of externalities in the
determination of steady-state growth paths.  In these models, the long-run
growth rates of economies are no longer exogenously given and need not be the
20meo.  More crucially economic policy, in particular fLocal polLcy, can affoct
not only tho output level but also the per capita growth rate.  in thio
framework, there ls scope  for rlch interactLons between the privato and the
public sector.  For example, Barro (1990)  buLlds a  long-run growth model ln
which there are complementarities between public and prlvate Lnvestment (the
marginal productivity of private investment depends on  the  level of public
investment).  Barro then shows that the size of the government which maximizes
the long-run growth rate occurs when the marginal soclal welfare cost of
ralsing taxes to finance public investment expenditures is just equal to the
marginal gain to the private sector through the externallty in private
investment.
The growth effects of taxation are analysed by King and Robson (1989).
They show how stochastic variations ln tax policies may lead to large
dLspersions in observed growth rates.  In a related paper, Easterly  (1990)
analyses the growth impact of taxation in a context where only one type of
capital good is taxed.  There are two possible interpretations of this set-up.
Firat capital in the informal sector may fully escape taxation.  Second
domestically produced capital may benefit from a discriminatory trade regime.
in both cases taxation is shown to reduce the steady-state rate of growth.
The result ls not very surprising insofar as, in this model, the government
performs no useful functions and the proceeds from taxes are rebated in a
lump-sum fashion to the private sector.  These models are therefore ill-suited
to determine the "optimal" size of government.  They can however cast some
llght on the growth-retarding effects of taxation. 7 Easterly provides some
empirical evidence that distortionary trade policies had a negative impact on
growth in developing countries.
b)  The political economy of fiscal policy
Another open issue is why governments behave the way they do. Gaining a
better understanding of governments' behaviour would be helpful in the design
of adjustment programs.  For example, difficulty in controlling fiscal
21imbalances have often been at the source of the exploding inflatLon and a
motLvation for fLical reform.  The papers ln the sympooLum address fLical
reform from the standpolnt of the theory of taxatLon taking lnto account
countries ddminiLtrative capabilities.  However, differences in country
experLences can also be usefully analysed from a  pooLtLve standpoint by
relying on the theory of public cholce and on game theory.
As an example of how the political economy approach to fiscal pollcy can
be useful in addressing issues raised ln thi8 symposium, consLder the use of
seLgnorage and tax reform implementation in a hypothetical economy, with a
weak administrative system.  As pointed out by Thirsk, and by the data in
Table 2, thLs weakness ls partly due to the stage of development of the
country.  But this weakness could also be due to the country's pol'tical
system.  Consider the following possibillty.  Those who oppose the
government's current policies (like  paying the the external debt) welcome the
inefficiency of the tax system, because it constrains the government in power
by facilitating tax evasion and imposing high tax collection costs.  In this
set-up, even the government in power may refrain from reforming the tax system
for fear that the more efficient apparatus that would result from a successful
tax reform would be used by the next government to carry out spending or
redistributive measures that the current government opposes.  Such a situation
is more likely to arise in countries with unstable and polarized political
systems.  Political stability in the sense of a strong government with a high
probability of staying in power would then be a prerequisite for engaging in
tax reform.  To give a concrete example, the major overhaul of the tax system
in Morocco (described by Thirak) was implementable precisely because the
political system was stable.  Also, more unstable and polarized polltical
systems will rely on inefficient taxes such as seignorage and trade taxes. 8
The political economy approach can also be used to provide explanations
of the size  of fiscal deficits, and of governments' patterns of borrowing.
Alesina and Tabellini  (1989) have developed a model in which a policymaker is
aware that in the future he may be replaced by a policymaker with different
22preferences about some aspects of fiscal policy (for instance each policymaker
will attempt to redistribute income in favor of his constituency).  The
policymaker is also aware that he iB  in control of how he allocates his
spending, but not necessarily of how the debt he contracted will be repaid in
the future.  Because of thi3 asymmetry, the policymaker may not fully
internalise the costs of running a deficit, and will consequently overborrow.
An before the tendency to overborrow will be greater, the more likely that the
government in power today will not be reelected tomorrow.
23Endnotes
1.  For a review of the literature on tax revenue, and issues  of tax reform
in developing countries see Ahmad and Stern (1989).
2.  In principle, the fiscal deficit includes all central government's
operations, but comparability across countries is flawed by the fact
that the definition of what is included in the central government
differs across countries.  See Blejer and Chu (1989) for further
discussion.
3.  In section 4, we suggest that a political economy perspective is useful
in understanding the insensitivity of fiscal expenditures and revenues.
4.  For a critique, see Killick et al. (1984).  For an insider evaluation of
adjustment programs, see Thomas et al. (1990).
5.  Quoted in Tanzi (1989).
6.  More precisely, in the papers by Tanzi, Chhibber and Dailami, and Cornia
and Stewart.
7.  Little is  known on the growth effects of fiscal policy.  See Barro
(1989) and Easterly (1990) for preliminary evidence.
8.  Evidence in support of this hypothesis is found in Cukierman, Edwards
and Tabellini  (1990).  After controlling for structural variables, they
find that countries with a high expected probability of government
change rely more heavily on seignorage.
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